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Notes
MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: IS THERE
A RELEVANT STANDARD OF CARE?*
The increased number of malpractice suits against psychotherapists poses a great
diflculty for courts in their application of an appropriate standard of care. While the
traditional medical malpractice standards of care are well defined, they are not appli-
cable to every psychotherapeutic technique. Consequently, the courts have struggled
in their attempts to formulate a standard of care for psychotherapists. In this Note,
the author proposes a "dynamic" standard of care as a solution, arguing that such a
standard would balance a mental health patient's right to quality care with the evolu-
tion of innovative psychotherapeutic practice&
INTRODUCTION
INCONSISTENT RESULTS in psychotherapy malpractice cases
reflect the complex nature of mental health treatment' and indi-
cate the need for a uniform standard of care. Until very recently,
legal action against mental health professionals2 was rare.3 Several
factors explain the virtual absence of litigation. First, a psychother-
apist may be able to prevent the patient's claim that the therapy
* First place, Theodore T. Sindell Award, for the outstanding essay in the area of Tort
Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1. "Psychotherapy is an undefined technique applied to unspecified cases with unpre-
dictable results." V. Raimy, quoted in N. FINKEL, MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH 73
(1976). Notwithstanding Raimy's incisive comment, other authorities have attempted to de-
fine this "undefined technique." One source defines psychotherapy as "[t]reatment designed
to produce a response by mental rather than by physical effects, including the use of sugges-
tion, persuasion, re-education, reassurance, and support, as well as the techniques of hypno-
sis, abreaction, and psychoanalysis which are employed in the so-called deep psychotherapy."
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1092 (26th ed. 1981).
2. The term "mental health professional" is used in this Note interchangeably with the
terms "therapist," "psychotherapist," and "practitioner." It encompasses a full range of pro-
fessionals in the mental health care field, including psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric
social workers, and other therapists. Cf note 88. Each of these professionals practices some
type of therapy or treatment the purpose of which is to relieve mental distress or illness.
Where appropriate, the discussion in this Note refers to specific types of mental health profes-
sionals. The literature concerning mental health care makes frequent reference to the mental
health professional as a "practitioner." Notwithstanding the identification of that term with
a lawyer who engages in the practice of his profession, "practitioner" is used in this Note to
refer solely to the mental health professional who is similarly engaged. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1055 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
3. See Appleson, More Patients Suing Their Psychiatrists, 68 A.B.A. J. 1353, 1353
(1982); Furrow, Will Psychotherapy Be Transformed in the 1980s?, 11 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 96, 96 (1983); Horan & Guerrini, Developing Legal Trends in Psychiatric
Malpractice, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 65, 65 (1981); Rothblatt & LeRoy, Avoiding Psychiatric
Malpractice, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 260, 261 & n.7 (1973); Taub, Psychiatric Malpractice in the
1980s: A Look at Some Areas of Concern, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 97, 97 (1983).
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injured him simply by convincing the patient that he is wrong.'
Second, the patient often has difficulty proving that the treatment
caused the injury,5 particularly where verbal therapy is involved.6
Third, since the public traditionally has refused to accept either the
existence of mental illness or its treatment,7 prospective litigants
who were reluctant to expose their psychiatric histories in open
court chose to avoid litigation altogether.8
The first two factors continue to deter aggrieved patients from
seeking judicial redress. But the stigma associated with mental
health care is breaking down,9 and so is the reluctance to sue psy-
chotherapists.'" At the same time, heightened expectations of con-
sumers 1l and third-party payors12 regarding the effectiveness of
4. The psychotherapist is uniquely qualified to deal with his patient's negative feelings
and thus may exert considerable influence over his patient. See Dawidoff, The Malpractice of
Psychiatrists, 1966 DUKE L.J. 696, 696; Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of
Psychiatry, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 401, 401 (1957); Slovenko, Malpractice in Psychiatry and Re-
lated Fields, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 7 (1981); Comment, The Liability of Psychiatrists for
Malpractice, 36 U. PIrr. L. REv. 108, 131 (1974). See also Horan & Guerrini, supra note 3,
at 72; Taub, supra note 3, at 97.
Often a patient will not consider a lawsuit because he believes that the success of the
therapy is a function of his own cooperation in the process. See Shapiro & Zimmerly, Cur-
rent Medicolegal Issues in Psychiatry, LEGAL MED. ANN. 327, 329 (1977) (arguing that suc-
cess or failure of therapy depends upon the patient to a much greater degree in psychiatry
than in other medical specialties).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77; see also Comment, supra note 4, at 108;
Taub, supra note 3, at 97; Comment, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F.L. REv.
405, 418 (1973) (discussing the difficulties inherent in establishing causation in a psychothera-
peutic malpractice action).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77; see also Furrow, supra note 3, at 96. Dete-
rioration in the patient's condition either during or after therapy may be a result of the pa-
tient's illness and not the therapist's treatment.
7. See generally G. CROCETTI, H. SPIRO & J. SIASSI, CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES
TOWARD MENTAL ILLNESS ch. 5 (1974) (discussing and surveying societal attitudes toward
mental illness).
8. See Nieland, Malpractice Liability of Psychiatric Professionals, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 22 (1979).
9. See G. CROCET=I, H. SPIRO & J. SIAssi, supra note 7, ch. 6.
10. See Appleson, supra note 3, at 1353.
11. Taub, supra note 3, at 97. Consumer consciousness regarding the quality of goods
and services is becoming an important factor in the dispensation of mental health care. For
example, Ralph Nader's Mental Health Research Group conducted a survey to analyze con-
sumer support for patient-therapist contracts which would define expectations about therapy.
As a result, a number of psychiatrists in Washington, D.C. agreed to enter into such con-
tracts. See S. ADAMS & M. ORGEL, THROUGH THE MENTAL HEALTH MAZEpassim (1975);
see also infra note 13.
12. See Furrow, supra note 3, at 117. Government agencies and corporations are fre-
quently a source of such financing. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 477 (1982); see also infra note 13.
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therapy 13 have made psychotherapists more vulnerable to law-
suits.14 The rise of litigation has exposed psychotherapeutic tech-
niques to increased judicial scrutiny. Courts have been hard-
pressed, however, to formulate a definitive standard of care against
which to measure the conduct of mental health professionals.1 6
What passes as a legitimate form of therapy in one jurisdiction may
be found unacceptable in the next. 7 Certainly one reason for the
irresolution surrounding the standard of care issue is the large
number of different and conflicting schools of therapy within the
mental health profession itself." A profusion of new forms of treat-
ment merely exacerbates the problem. 19 Moreover, the very fact of
change as a characteristic of psychotherapy would appear to defy
the notion of a definitive standard of care.
Yet a rigid standard of care which fails to recognize the need for
new techniques is not the solution. In an attempt to accommodate
the evolutionary nature of psychotherapy, some courts have al-
lowed psychotherapists who ascribe to minority schools of thought
to practice within certain limits.2' This approach, however, is sub-
ject to wide variation in its application.21 As a result, a therapist
13. See Ayllon & Skuban, Accountability in Psychiatry: A Test Case, 4 J. BEaAV. THER.
Exp. PSYCHOLOGY 19 (1973); Reeder, The Patient-Client as Consumer: Some Observations
on the Changing Professional-Client Relationship, 13 J. HEALTH Soc. BEHAV. 406 (1972);
Somers, Accountability, Public Policy, and Psychiatry, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 959 (1977).
Reimbursement of psychotherapists by third parties such as Medicare may be partially
responsible for the increase in therapy malpractice cases for two reasons. First, the attrac-
tiveness of third party payment plans will spur growth in the number of therapists delivering
services. Second, such funding requires a more serious weighing of the benefits and risks of
therapy, thereby exposing the profession to closer scrutiny. This process, in turn, leads to an
increased risk of litigation. See Furrow, supra note 3, at 117.
14. Statistics showing the number of claims brought against psychotherapists are not
available, according to Dr. Paul Slawson, Chairman of the Professional Liability Committee
of the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Appleson, supra note 3, at 1353. A review
of statistics compiled by the APA, which is the largest malpractice insurer of psychiatrists in
the nation, indicates that the number of practitioners who are insured under the program has
more than tripled since the program began in 1972. Id.
15. For a representative sampling of lawsuits against therapists, see 3 D. HOGAN, THE
REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 35-334 (1979) (synopses of 300 reported decisions).
16. See generally text accompanying notes infra 84-94 (discussing standard of care in
the context of psychotherapy).
17. For example, in some jurisdictions the less restrictive "open door" approach is an
acceptable method of treatment under certain circumstances. By contrast, practitioners in
other jurisdictions are limited to the traditional and more restrictive "confinement" ap-
proach. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 143-90.
19. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
21. See id.
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who deviates from traditional approaches and who practices new or
unconventional techniques cannot always predict whether his ap-
proach would survive a legal challenge. The extent to which such a
therapist will be held liable for injuries flowing from his conduct
remains very much an unsettled question.
The challenge for courts is twofold. They must apply a standard
of care to techniques that are as antithetical to one another as classi-
cal Freudian psychoanalysis is to physical intimacy.22 Courts must
also balance the right of practitioners to devise new treatments with
the right of patients to obtain responsible health care.23
This Note proposes a standard of care to address these concerns.
Part I describes the plaintiff's most effective legal theory against his
psychotherapist-a negligence claim similar to medical malprac-
tice2 4 -and the steps that a patient must take to establish a prima
facie case under this cause of action.25 Part II discusses the contro-
versy surrounding the formulation of a standard of care in psycho-
therapeutic malpractice,26 with particular emphasis on the standard
applied in cases that involve unconventional therapies.27 Part III
outlines the major policy conflict behind reforming the standard of
care: the need to encourage innovative psychotherapeutic tech-
niques without denying patients their right to receive responsible
mental health care.28 Part IV analyzes the elements of an appropri-
ate standard of care and concludes that a "dynamic model"29 would
22. This challenge is illustrated by the ongoing debate between those adhering to tradi-
tional Freudian psychoanalysis and those who advocate physical intimacy as a means of psy-
chotherapy. The conflict between these two schools dates back to at least the 1920's, when
Sandor Ferenczi began to advocate physical affection as a means of counteracting emotional
deprivation. Freud expressed grave misgivings about these innovations in a letter to
Ferenczi:
Now picture what will be the result of publishing your technique. There is no revo-
lutionary who is not driven out of the field by a still more radical one. A number of
independent thinkers in matters of technique will say to themselves: why stop at a
kiss? Certainly one gets further when one adopts 'pawing' as well, which after all
doesn't make a baby. And then bolder ones will come along who will go further to
peeping and showing-and soon we shall have accepted in the technique of analysis
the whole repertoire of demiviergerie and petting parties, resulting in an enormous
increase of interest in psychoanalysis among both analysts and patients.
3 E. JONES, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 163-65 (1957), cited with approval in
Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 895-96, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (concurring
opinion); see infra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 170-211 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 78-190 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 142-90 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 191-211 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
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best provide guidance to courts, practitioners, and patients.30
I. THE LEGAL SETTING FOR PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC
MALPRACTICE
A. The Basis for a Cause of Action in Psychotherapeutic
Malpractice
Courts have applied medical malpractice principles to analogous
issues involving mental health professionals.31 This is not surpris-
ing given that the inquiry in either instance concerns the "quality of
services rendered in the name of treatment., 32
A plaintiff alleging misfeasance by a psychotherapist may base
his cause of action on any one of a number of theories. He may
bring an action based on contract.33 Liability under this theory
may arise as a result of the practitioner's breach of an express obli-
gation to use proper skill and care.34 More typically, however, lia-
bility is based upon the practitioner's breach of an implied
obligation of conduct.35 The plaintiff also may frame a complaint in
fraud, as where the psychotherapist offers a proposed treatment to
the patient for the purpose of deceiving him.36
Most plaintiffs, however, base their claims against psychothera-
pists on a tort theory.37 Under this cause of action courts must
30. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
31. See, eg., Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (applying general princi-
ples of the law governing the liability of physicians and surgeons to a psychiatrist who admin-
istered electroconvulsive therapy). See also Morse, The Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 16
BUFFALO L. REv. 649, 652 (1967); Shea, Legal Standard of Care for Psychiatrists and Psy-
chologists, 6 W. ST. U. L. REv. 71, 71-73 (1979).
32. See Slovenko, supra note 4, at 5 & n.l.
33. Feldman, "Mal-Psychotherapy" Suits May Soon Beset Psychiatrists, ROCHE REPORT
FRONTIERS OF PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (1978); Feldman & Ward, Psychotherapeutic Injury: Re-
shaping the Implied Contract as an Alternative to Malpractice, 58 N.C.L. REv. 63 (1979).
34. See, eg., Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 47 Mich. App. 111, 209 N.W.2d
309 (1973).
Breach of contract or warranty usually arises from the physician's failure to achieve satis-
factory results which were warranted, failure to perform services in a specific manner, or
failure to perform services personally. W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE & FO-
RENSIC SCIENCE 556 (2d ed. 1970); see also Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (summary judgment for defendant reversed where defendant stated that particular
treatment was "perfectly safe").
35. See, eg., Conklin v. Draper, 229 A.D. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529, af'd, 254 N.Y. 620, 173
N.E. 892 (1930).
36. Horan & Guerrini, supra note 3, at 66, 69-70.
37. The facts of a given case may indicate liability under more than one theory. See,
eg., Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 329, 178 N.E.2d 303, 304
(1961) (noting that the same transaction could give rise to both contractual and noncontrac-
tual duties and thereby create causes of action in either tort or contract).
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define an appropriate standard of care and then determine whether
the defendant-therapist's conduct meets that standard.38
B. Establishing the Prima Facie Case in Tort
1. Requisite Elements
The plaintiff in a malpractice action based on tort must establish
four elements to make out a prima facie case. 39 He must show
(1) that there was a legal duty which required the defendant's ad-
herence to a certain standard of care in treating the plaintiff;
(2) that the defendant breached this duty either through his action
or his failure to act; (3) that the plaintiff suffered an injury; and
(4) that the defendant's breach of duty directly and proximately
caused the injury.'
Dinnerstein v. United States41 illustrates how the four requisite
elements arise in the context of psychotherapeutic malpractice.
There, the widow of a psychiatric patient sued the United States for
its failure to prevent her husband's suicide. The patient had a six-
year history of deepening depression and on one occasion had made
a suicidal "gesture."'42 On the advice of a private psychiatrist, he
sought admission to a Veterans' Administration hospital as a pre-
caution against suicide.43 He requested individual psychotherapy
but the hospital could only offer him group therapy.' Allegedly
depressed by this denial, the patient refused to admit himself.45 The
38. See infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
39. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). An exception to this requirement is found in the relatively
narrow class of cases where courts have applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The plaintiff in
such a case need not prove the four elements because the defendant's conduct by itself creates
a clear inference of negligence. See, e.g., Hammer v. Rosen, 7 A.D.2d 216, 181 N.Y.S. 805
(1959), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960) (psychiatrist's phys-
ical abuse of patient created prima facie case of malpractice).
The court in Hammer implied that if the defendant-therapist in such a case is able to
introduce expert evidence that the assault or other conduct was proper treatment, the burden
of proof would shift back to the plaintiff to produce expert testimony in rebuttal. Comment,
Standard of Care in Administering Non-Traditional Psychotherapy, 7 U.C.D. L. REv. 56, 73
(1974).
40. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 39, § 30, at 164-65.
41. 486 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. Id. at 37. The decedent had previously driven his car into a bridge in what he
termed a suicide attempt. This incident resulted in only minimal damage to himself and his
automobile. Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 36.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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next day, however, he returned and again sought admission." The
admitting psychiatrist on this occasion diagnosed the patient's con-
dition as a "depressive reaction."'47 Though aware of his history,
the psychiatrist did not consider the patient suicidal;4 8 he assigned
him to a seventh-floor ward without any special supervision.4 9 An-
tidepressant medication was discontinued to discern his true psy-
chological state.5 0 Later that evening, the patient complained that
he had become even more depressed because of the inadequacy of
the group therapy program.5 The psychiatrist neither issued any
additional orders regarding supervision of the patient nor pre-
scribed antidepressant medication. 2 The following day, the patient
jumped to his death from a seventh-floor unsecured lavatory
window.5 3
The hospital's duty to guard against the possibility of suicide
arose when the hospital, in full knowledge of the patient's mental
health history, admitted the patient to its care. 4 By assigning him
to a seventh-floor ward and failing to restrict his movement, the
hospital breached its duty. These acts and omissions directly and
proximately caused the injury." Had the hospital's psychiatrists
assigned the patient to a ground floor ward or adequately super-
vised and restricted his behavior, they could have prevented the fa-
tal jump.5 7
46. Id.
47. Id. Psychotic depressive reaction refers to those "severely depressed patients with
gross interpretations of reality including delusions and hallucinations who do not have a
history of previous depressions or of marked mood swings but whose symptoms are reactive
(i.e., attributable to some identifiable experience) and of psychotic degree." PSYCHIATRIC
DICnONARY 166 (5th ed. 1981).
48. 486 F.2d at 36.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 38.
55. Id. at 38-39.
56. Id. The Dinnerstein court applied a "but for" test of causation: but for certain acts
or omissions, the injury would not have occurred. See infra text accompanying note 57. In
addition to "but for" causation, a prevalent approach has been the "substantial factor" test.
Where two or more agents are involved in the injury and either one alone would have been
sufficient to cause the injury, the defendant will be held liable if his conduct was a "substan-
tial factor" in causing the injury. See, eg., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry.,
146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
57. 486 F.2d at 37.
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2. Establishing the Causation Element in a Psychotherapeutic
Malpractice Case
Proof of causation may be more problematic in a psychothera-
peutic malpractice case than in a typical medical malpractice case.
Despite a close connection between physical and mental health,"8 a
physician's treatment methods may offer a much more readily dis-
cernible mode of conduct in which to pinpoint causation-whereas
a psychotherapist's treatment may not. For instance, a physician
may turn to physical or chemical agents to cure his patient's bodily
ills. A psychotherapist also might use these techniques to treat cer-
tain mental disorders; 9 for others, however, he might use nonphysi-
cal techniques such as persuasion or suggestion. 60  These
nonphysical forms of treatment can hinder a plaintiff's efforts to
prove causation because the precise impact of the psychotherapist's
conduct is not necessarily tangible or quantifiable.
During the course of psychotherapy, for example, a series of
psychotic episodes61 of varying intensity and duration may punctu-
ate an overall trend of improvement.6 2 However, a particularly pro-
longed or intense psychotic episode, if viewed in isolation, would
suggest that the therapist's treatment is to blame for the patient's
deterioration. 63 It may not be clear, therefore, whether such epi-
sodes were induced by the therapy or whether they are just natural
incidents of the healing process.' In the absence of sufficient
knowledge of the course of the illness, an allegation that the therapy
caused the deterioration is purely speculative.65
The ease with which a plaintiff can show causation also depends
on whether the therapy in question is nonverbal or verbal. In non-
58. Both share a common purpose to alleviate pathological human disorders.
59. Not all psychotherapists are permitted to practice physical and chemical techniques.
Psychiatrists may diagnose patients, prescribe drugs and medicine, and administer shock
therapy, while psychologists may not. D. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIA-
TRISTS 2 (1973); 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 718 (1968).
60. For a brief summary of psychotherapeutic techniques, see definition cited supra note
I.
61. A psychotic episode occurs when the subject has a "persistent misevaluation of per-
ception not attributable to sensory defect of afferent abnormality and not accounted for on
the basis of special social indoctrination or unusual life experience." D. KLEIN & J. DAVIS,
DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS (1969).
62. See D. DAWIDOFF, supra note 59, at 72-73 (discussing a hypothetical case in which
a patient sues the therapist even before any overall trend of improvement has had a chance to
emerge).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 72.
65. Id. at 73 & n.48.
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verbal therapy the practitioner's action is more likely to take an
identifiable form that has identifiable effects. Perhaps the most
clear-cut examples are somatic therapies" such as psychotropic
drug medication67 or electroconvulsive therapy. 8 Actionable con-
duct in the nonverbal context takes many other forms as well, in-
cluding breach of confidentiality,6 9 failure to obtain informed
consent,70 negligent administration of drugs and mechanical thera-
pies, 7 ' negligent diagnosis, 72 wrongful commitment,7 malpractice
in psychosurgery,74 and sexual impropriety.7" The affirmative na-
66. Somatic therapies are chemical, hormonal, or physical treatments that directly or
indirectly affect the brain and-through their cerebral action-produce or inhibit behavorial
changes. F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 271
(1966).
67. Drugs that have an effect on behavior, experience, or psychic function are known as
psychotropics or phrenotropics, and are differentiated as follows: neuroleptics (major tran-
quilizers); anziolytic sedatives (minor tranquilizers); antimanic agents (lithium); antidepres-
sants; psychostimulants; and psychodysleptics (hallucinogens). PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY
523-24 (5th ed. 1981).
68. Electroconvulsive treatment involves passing of an electrical current through the
brain. This is accomplished by placing two electrodes on the temporal region of the skull.
Id. at 648. Electroconvulsive therapy is indicated in certain psychiatric conditions, including
mania, depressions, and certain cases of schizophrenia. Id. Although complications are rare,
the treatment can result in bone fractures due to muscular contraction. Id.
69. Trust is essential for recovery from mental illness. See Erikson, I PSYCHOLOGICAL
ISSUES 50-63 (1959), reprinted in Dawidoff, supra note 4, at 704 n.34. A breach of trust may
occur when a psychotherapist reveals information about a patient to the patient's employer
without the patient's consent. A breach of trust may also occur within the confines of the
therapist-patient relationship itself, as, for example, when the therapist engages in physical
intimacy with his patient. The therapist must be able to bring about a certain closeness and
identification in the transaction, such as that which occurs in the transference phenomenon.
See infra text accompanying notes 184-87. He must, however, scrupulously avoid instilling in
his patient an excessive or irreversible dependency which could arise as a result of a physical
relationship.
70. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
71. See, eg., Bellandi v. Park Sanitarium Ass'n, 214 Cal. 472, 6 P.2d 508 (1931) (hospi-
tal found liable where its personnel, in an effort to restrain patient, had knocked him down,
applied a tourniquet to his neck, and forced him to inhale ether).
72. See, eg., Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1957) (therapist who interpreted a
patient's physical symptoms as hysterical paralysis held liable for refusing to perform diag-
nostic tests on the patient, who subsequently died from injuries sustained after falling down a
flight of stairs).
73. One survey of cases concluded that some courts have been reluctant to treat the
issue of unjustifiable confinement thoroughly because the average malpractice suit is too brief
to explain adequately to the trier of fact the complex issues that are involved. Shea, supra
note 31, at 88-91.
74. The term psychosurgery refers to any neurological operation or intervention the
primary aim of which is to modify emotions or behavior in the absence of known physical
disease. PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 518-19 (5th ed. 1981). At present, the efficacy of psy-
chosurgery remains to be determined. T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, CLINICIAL HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 95-96 (1982).
75. See infra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
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ture of these acts stands in sharp contrast to the mere words of
verbal therapy.
In verbal therapy,76 on the other hand, a therapist's "action"
might consist of mere suggestion or, at most, a prescription of be-
havior that the patient might follow. It does not involve direct in-
tervention. As a consequence, the therapist in this kind of suit
typically will avoid liability.7 7
Thus, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to establish the causa-
tion element of his prima facie case. Establishing a breach of the
standard of care is even more problematic because courts have not
prescribed a single, definitive standard.
II. STANDARD OF CARE
In a typical case, the therapy-produced injury is only one ele-
ment of the malpractice case.78 It is also necessary to determine
whether the defendant's level of care deviated from the accepted
standard.79
Courts have analyzed the question of standard of care in the
context of both conventional and unconventional therapies by en-
gaging in a number of subinquiries. Given that psychotherapy is a
specialty profession, courts have had to determine the standard ap-
propriate to specialists.8" They also have had to consider whether a
local or a national standard is appropriate."' Further, they have
examined whether the patient's "informed consent" will serve as a
defense for the therapist.8 2 Finally, in deciding the standard of care
for unconventional therapies, courts have evaluated the applicabil-
ity of the "respectable minority" principle.8 3
76. That plaintiffs have had difficulty in framing a malpractice complaint when verbal
therapy is involved may be negatively inferred from statistics compiled by the American Psy-
chiatric Association regarding the sources of psychiatric malpractice. Verbal therapy does
not even appear in an APA listing of the eight most frequent kinds of claims. See Taub, supra
note 3, at 97.
77. Watkins & Watkins, Malpractice in Clinical Social Work- A Perspective on Civil
Liability in the 1980's, 1 BEHAV. So1. & L. 55, 69 (1983). Given the near impossibility of
success in establishing a prima facie case when verbal therapy is at issue, it would seem
appropriate to lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof.
78. But see supra note 39 (res ipsa loquitur lessens plaintiff's burden of proof).
79. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 39, § 37, at 236-38.
80. See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 142-90 and accompanying text.
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A. Formulations of the Standard of Care for Conventional
Therapies
1. Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances
One of the few settled points of law regarding the standard of
care in psychotherapy is the principle that a practitioner is not the
insurer of a perfect cure.84 Nor is a practitioner required to exercise
the highest degree of skill possible or even extraordinary skill or
care. 5 Rather, the requirement is that he exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.
86
Courts look to the psychotherapist's special knowledge and skill
when determining what is "reasonable under the circumstances.,
87
As a specialist, 8 the psychotherapist is held to the standard of care
exercised by other professionals in his field of expertise who are sim-
ilarly situated.89
Once the court articulates an appropriate standard of care, the
plaintiff usually must provide expert testimony from within the pro-
fession to prove his case. Of course, the defendant may bring in his
own expert to rebut the testimony of the plaintiff's expert. Such
84. See, ag., Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968). In Nichol-
son, the court noted that even where the parties enter into an express contract containing a
warranty for a "cure," the contract will not be enforced unless the statements of the parties
clearly show that a warranty was made at the time the contract was formed. Id. at 41-42, 162
N.W.2d at 316; see also Carl v. Matzko, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 446, 455, 249 A.2d 808, 812
(1968), citing Donaldson v. Maffuci, 397 Pa. 548, 553, 156 A.2d 835, 838 (1959) (physician
neither warrants a cure nor guarantees results of treatments).
85. See Leavell v. Alton Oschner Med. Found., 201 F. Supp. 805 (D. La. 1962); Carroll
v. Richardson, 201 Va. 157, 110 S.E.2d 193 (1959); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 773, 205 P.2d 3
(1949); Buckner v. Wheeldon, 225 N.C. 62, 33 S.E.2d 480 (1945).
86. See, e.g., Fear v. Rundle, 506 F.2d 331, 336 n.6 (3d Cir. 1974), cert denied sub nom.
Anderson v. Fear, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 comment m (1965) provides:
If the actor has in fact more than the minimum of these qualities [i.e., attention,
knowledge, perception, memory, intelligence, and judgment], he is required to exer-
cise the superior qualities that he has in a manner reasonable under the circum-
stances. The standard becomes, in other words, that of a reasonable man with such
superior attributes.
88. The term "specialist" as applied to the psychotherapist also refers to the particular
subspecialty that he practices. The case law on psychotherapy encompasses a wide range of
specialists, from psychiatrists to therapists having no medical background to pastoral
counselors.
89. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Boston City Hosp., 358 Mass. 639, 266 N.E.2d 292 (1971);
Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa
1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Tanner v. Sanders, 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718 (1933). Because
the conduct of a specialist is judged by comparison with that of other specialists, the psycho-
therapist may be liable for negligence where like action by a general practitioner might not
impose liability. See Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262-63, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440,
447 (1968).
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testimony enables the court to decide what a reasonably qualified
practitioner would do under like circumstances.9 ° It also enables
the trier of fact to compare meaningfully the defendant's conduct
with that of his peers91 to determine whether his conduct deviated
from that of a reasonably qualified practitioner.
As a general rule, expert testimony is required where the subject
matter is "sufficiently technical that a lay juror cannot be expected
to be equally well qualified to form a worthwhile judgment. '9 2 In
some cases, however, courts have dispensed with the requirement of
expert testimony because either the malpractice is so obvious that it
falls within common knowledge93  or the defendant's conduct
prompts a res ipsa loquitur inquiry.94
The legal usefulness of professionally-prescribed standards is a
potential point of debate in any malpractice suit. Not only may
professionals be less than objective when proposing standards to
govern their own conduct, but also competing disciplines within the
profession may produce conflicting expert testimony. Conse-
quently, the privilege that therapists, as professionals, enjoy in pro-
posing legal standards of care may be subject to close judicial
90. See, e.g., Powell v. Risser, 375 Pa. 60, 99 A.2d 454 (1953) (plaintiff's own expert
testified that the defendant's wetpack treatment method was in accordance with accepted
practice).
91. See, eg., Dimitrijevic v. Chicago Wesley Memorial Hosp., 92 Ill. App. 2d 251, 236
N.E.2d 309 (1968) (expert testimony required to prove negligence when there was no evi-
dence of a prior suicide attempt by plaintiff); Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520
(1953) (expert required to evaluate electroconvulsive therapy procedures and hazards when
patient's legs were fractured during treatment).
Courts have experienced difficulty with the expert testimony requirement in the field of
psychotherapy. One of the issues that has arisen concerns whether a nonmedical psycholo-
gist can testify as to the issues of mental condition or competency. See People ex rel. Welling-
ton v. Wellington, 34 Ill. App. 3d 515, 340 N.E.2d 31 (1975). This issue has not received
uniform treatment throughout the country. Id. at 517, 340 N.E.2d at 33-34. A similar issue
is whether a medical professional from one state can qualify as an expert in another. See
Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 403, 499 P.2d 156, 159 (1972) (out-of-state board-certi-
fied specialist can testify against in-state board-certified specialist). A final issue of contro-
versy is whether an expert from one "school" of thought can provide background about
another "school." Medical malpractice law permits this practice so long as the methods of
treatment espoused by the two schools are generally the same. Wemmett v. Mount, 134 Or.
305, 313-14, 292 P. 93, 96 (1930). The extent to which courts will permit such crossing-over
of expert testimony in psychotherapeutic malpractice cases is unclear at present.
92. Sandow v. Weyerhauser Co., 252 Or. 377, 380, 449 P.2d 426, 428 (1969).
93. See, eg., Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934); see also Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis.
2d 173, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577 (1980) (expert testimony not required where negligence is ap-
parent and undisputed).
94. See, e.g., Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 380, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d
65, 67 (1960) (expert testimony on issue of malpractice unnecessary where "the very nature of
the acts complained of bespeaks. . . malpractice").
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scrutiny. The case of Helling v. Carey 95 illustrates how one court
questioned and rejected a standard developed by professionals in a
health care specialty. The court held that the ophthalmology pro-
fession's standard regarding glaucoma testing did not provide ade-
quate safeguards for eye patients. 96 Quoting Justice Learned Hand
in The TJ. Hooper,97 the court stated:
[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however
persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is re-
quired; there are precautions so imperative that even their uni-
versal disregard will not excuse their omission.
98
This same principle could surface in the context of psychotherapy:
the therapist who follows the accepted and customary practice of
his specialty may be held liable nonetheless.
2. Local vs. National Standard
Courts also evaluate standards of care through application of
the traditional "locality rule" or, alternatively, a national stan-
dard.99 The locality rule holds a practitioner to the level of care
used by members of the profession in the same line of practice in his
own or a similar community."°° A national standard, in contrast,
views the required level of care as a function of the common prac-
tice throughout the profession.10'
Courts recently have begun to discard the "locality rule" in
favor of a national standard. This trend may be explained by the
increasing accessibility of information available to members of the
profession.102 Moreover, recognition of board certification and the
95. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
96. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
97. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
98. Id. at 740.
99. See, eg., Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945 (1976), rev'gon rehearing
258 Ark. Adv. Sh. 766, 529 S.W.2d Adv. Sh. 330 (1975). The Arkansas Supreme Court
initially adopted a national standard of care for physicians but reversed itself on rehearing,
holding that the local rule applied. For a discussion of the court's action, see Note, Medical
Malpractice Standard of Care: The Same or Similar Localities Rule Revisited, 1 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 488 (1978). But see Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78 (1967)
(locality rule found to have "no present day vitality" and is only one factor to be considered
in determining degree of care rendered). See generally Note, National Standard of Care-A
New Dimension of the Locality Rule, 36 ARK. L. REv. 161 (1983).
100. See, eg., Inouye v. Black, 238 Cal. App. 2d 31, 33, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1965).
101. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 199, 348 A.2d 245,
252 (1975); see generally Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. Rnv.
884, 887-89 & nn.17-23 (1962) (survey indicating that techniques of medical specialists are
similar throughout the country).
102. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Blair v. Eblen, 461
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development of national organizations have eroded the community
aspect of standard of care.10 3
The judicial movement toward a national standard and away
from the "locality rule" is beneficial to psychotherapists. Specialties
are inherently amenable to national standards because the treat-
ment methods of a given specialty are seldom, if ever, geographi-
cally oriented."° A national standard would reduce some of the
confusion that courts encounter in determining a standard of care.
It also would be more responsive to developments in mental health
care practice throughout the country.'0 5 Most importantly, a na-
tional standard would lead to a consistent and more responsible ap-
plication of the standard of care.
A single national standard does not necessarily imply a one-di-
mensional, procrustean rule. Instead, a single national standard
could operate within a unified framework and yet be flexible enough
to deal equitably with all fact situations.' 06
B. Events Which Might Preclude a Court From Reaching the
Standard of Care Issue
1. Informed Consent
The psychotherapist's use of informed consent as a defense to a
malpractice claim may prevent courts from reaching the standard
of care issue. In its traditional formulation, the informed consent
S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970); see also B. SCHuTz, LEGAL LIABILrrY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 4
(1982) (commenting on demise of locality rule).
103. Horan & Guerrini, supra note 3, at 67; see also Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 614-
15, 248 N.W.2d 171, 186 (1976) (noting that the locality rule developed prior to accreditation
of medical schools by the American Medical Association's Council of Medical Education in
1906).
104. Michaud & Hutton, Medical Tort Law: The Emergence of a Specialty Standard of
Care, 16 TULSA L.J. 720, 730-33 (1981). Most courts even refer to the national standard as a
"specialty standard of care." Id. at 730.
105. Two commentators have discussed this concept in the context of the traditional phy-
sician. Their comments are equally applicable to psychotherapy:
The comprehensive coverage of the Journal of the American Medical Association,
the availability of numerous other journals, the ubiquitous "detail men" of the drug
companies, closed-circuit television presentations of medical subjects, special radio
networks for physicians, tape recorded digests of medical literature, and hundreds
of widely available postgraduate courses all serve to keep physicians informed and
increasingly to establish national standards. Medicine realizes this, so it is inevita-
ble that the law will do likewise.
D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 183-84 (1960).
106. Given the existence of subspecialties within the profession, a single national stan-
dard of care for all psychotherapists is arguably impossible-except, perhaps, under a strict
liability theory. But this arrangement does not preclude the possibility of a national standard
for each subspeeialty.
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doctrine requires a physician to disclose to the patient certain infor-
mation about possible risks attendant to a contemplated treat-
ment.10 7 He may proceed with the treatment only if the patient has
voluntarily consented to it."10 The purpose of the informed consent
doctrine is to protect a patient's ability to determine his own course
of treatment, 10 9 and courts have extended such protection to pa-
tients receiving mental health care.110
Informed consent in the psychotherapeutic context presents
very special problems for courts. The doctrine assumes that the pa-
tient is competent.111 Realistically, however, the patient's ability to
make an informed, voluntary choice may be impaired by his ill-
ness,112 particularly in situations where he has become dependent
on the therapist.113 In the gray area between competency and in-
competency, courts must determine whether the patient had suffi-
cient mental ability to understand the disclosed information and to
make a rational choice based on the information given to him.114
The extent of a psychotherapist's duty to disclose depends on
the type of therapy involved. In the case of conventional psycho-
therapies, the professional need only disclose "those risks which a
reasonable man would consider material to his decision whether or
not to undergo treatment."' 15 This limitation relieves practitioners
of the burden of having to explain every conceivable risk." 6
New or unconventional treatments, on the other hand, require
that the therapist disclose the nature of the treatment and its collat-
107. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781-82, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see
also Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 228, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (1962) (full disclosure not
required (1) in actual emergency where patient not in condition to consent or (2) where it
might result in alarming the patient, thereby increasing the risk either through apprehension
or through the patient's refusal of a treatment which carries only minimal risk).
108. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
109. Jeffries v. McCague, 242 Pa. Super. 76, 84, 363 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1976).
110. Eg., Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. July 10, 1973).
111. See id. at 2064.
112. See Dawidoff, Insanity, Intimacy and Infidelity: Trends in Psychiatric Malpractice,
TRIAL, June 1977, at 27, 29.
113. See Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treat-
ment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461, 487 (1978).
114. It has been observed that an evaluation of competency should address: (1) whether
the patient evidences a choice; (2) whether that choice is a reasonable one; (3) whether the
choice is based on rational reasons; (4) whether the patient has an ability to understand the
information vital to the decision-making process; and (5) whether the patient has an actual
understanding of that information. Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to
Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280-82 (1977).
115. Jeffries v. McCague, 242 Pa. Super. 76, 84, 363 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1976).
116. Id. at 85, 363 A.2d at 1176.
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eral risks. 117 To protect the patient in this situation, the law speci-
fies a two-part duty of disclosure." 8 The therapist must disclose all
known collateral risks, 19 and also make reasonable efforts to dis-
cover unknown collateral risks. 12 ' Assuming that these require-
ments are met, and the patient has consented, liability will depend
upon the reasonableness of the treatment itself.'2 1 The treatment is
"reasonable" if the therapist is able to conclude that enough is
known about the procedure's collateral risks to justify its use. 12 2
While the informed consent doctrine may preclude a court from
reaching the standard of care issue, it ensures a balance between the
rights of patients and the development of therapeutic techniques. 23
It protects patients by assigning liability where consent is invali-
dated either through a lack of competency on the part of the patient
or because of faulty or insufficient information disclosure on the
part of the therapist. As a further precaution, it assigns liability
where the therapist has failed to meet the heightened disclosure
duty that attaches to less conventional therapy. Even though in-
formed consent does operate to restrict therapists, it also grants
them a carefully circumscribed freedom 1 24 to pursue unconven-
tional, yet agreed-upon treatments. 125
2. Stringent Requirements for the Prima Facie Case: Topel v.
Long Island Jewish Medical Center
126
The informed consent doctrine is not the only factor that may
117. D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22.13 (1983). Those
cases usually arise where (1) there is a collateral side effect to treatment; (2) the practitioner
fails to warn the patient adequately of that possibility when securing the consent; or (3) the
practitioner falls to advise the patient as to alternative modes of treatment.
118. See Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628,
630-33 (1970).
119. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 300 (1965): "When an act is negligent if
done without reasonable preparation, the actor, to avoid being negligent, is required to make
the preparation which a reasonable man in his position would recognize as necessary to pre-
vent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another."
121. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 118, at 633.
122. Id.
123. See infra note 125.
124. The license is not absolute. Aside from the limitation that the disclosure duty places
on this freedom, courts have held that a patient's consent does not insulate a doctor from
liability for negligence in the administration of the therapy. See, eg., Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.
2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950).
125. H.L.A. Hart perceives the unimpeded exercise of free choice as a doctrine that "en-
ables individuals to experiment . . . and to discover things valuable both to themselves and
to others." H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 21-22 (1963).
126. 55 N.Y.2d 682, 431 N.E.2d 293, 446 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1981).
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preclude a court from reaching the standard of care issue. Re-
cently, a doctrine has evolved which could conceivably make the
standard of care irrelevant. In Topel v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center,127 the court held that expert testimony which fails to negate
the factors underlying a psychiatrist's professional judgment is an
insufficient basis for claiming negligence. 128 This requirement
stands in stark contrast to the conventional rule regarding burden
of proof. The latter rule requires the plaintiff merely to produce
expert testimony in support of his claim,129 not to negate his oppo-
nent's defense.
In Topel, a suicidal patient was admitted to a hospital for psy-
chiatric treatment after having twice attempted suicide. 3' The hos-
pital's examining psychiatrist considered the patient's condition
"life threatening," and ordered that the patient be observed at fif-
teen-minute intervals.131  Eventually, while left alone in his room,
the patient committed suicide.1 32 Members of his family sued the
hospital and the psychiatrist for malpractice. 133 At trial, the plain-
tiff's expert testified that observation at fifteen-minute intervals con-
stituted a deviation from the accepted medical practice.134  The
defendant's expert maintained that the decision whether to keep the
patient on constant observation, as opposed to observation at fif-
teen-minute intervals, was purely a matter of professional discre-
tion. 1 35 As such, the expert contended, the psychiatrist could not
be held liable.1 36 The trial court agreed with the defendant and
127. Id.
128. Id. at 684-85, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
129. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
130. 55 N.Y.2d 682, 686, 431 N.E.2d 293, 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d 932, 935 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 686-87, 431 N.E.2d at 296, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part). The attending psychiatrist based his judgment upon the following factors: (1) the
patient's adverse reaction to constant surveillance; (2) the possiblity that his heart condition
would be aggravated by continuing such surveillance; (3) the "gesture-like nature" of his
previous suicidal tendencies; (4) the rehabilitative aspects of "open ward" treatment; and (5)
the enhanced probability of obtaining the patient's consent to electroconvulsive therapy in the
more relaxed open ward atmosphere. Id. at 685, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
132. Id. at 688, 431 N.E.2d at 297, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part).
133. Id. at 685, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934. The court dismissed the claim
against the hospital because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that it had improperly
carried out the psychiatrist's fifteen-minute observation order. Id. at 684, 431 N.E.2d at 294,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
134. Id. at 688-89, 431 N.E.2d at 297, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 684, 431 N.E.2d at 294-95, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 933-34.
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overturned a jury verdict for the plaintiff.137 It dismissed the case
on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie
case. 1
38
The Topel court's strict rule treats plaintiffs in psychotherapeu-
tic malpractice suits harshly. 139 It significantly raises the eviden-
tiary threshold that such a plaintiff must meet to have his case
submitted to the jury. Proponents of the Topel rule may argue that
it is beneficial because it acts to screen out ostensibly unwarranted
claims. Realistically, however, the strict rule discourages even well-
founded lawsuits against psychotherapists."4 Its result is to leave
many deserving plaintiffs without a remedy against their
psychotherapists.
3. Topel in the Context of Unconventional Therapies
The litigation-deterrent effect of the Topel rule is probably most
pronounced in cases that involve unconventional therapies. Con-
sider the following hypothetical example. A plaintiff alleges injuries
resulting from his psychiatrist's use of an unconventional treatment.
The defendant-psychiatrist developed the technique, and to date is
the only person who practices it. Because no other practitioner of
this technique is available, the plaintiff must resort to the use of an
expert who is, at best, only vaguely familiar with it. At trial, the
plaintiff's expert is unable to negate the factors underlying the de-
fendant's technique, and the claim is summarily dismissed.
What is unacceptable here is that the expert testimony is labeled
insufficient only because the evidentiary rule about what constitutes
a prima facie showing has been tightened. Such testimony might
have been sufficient under the traditional requirements for a prima
facie case.141 Since it is futile for the hypothetical plaintiff to pursue
his claim in a Topel jurisdiction, he is effectively denied judicial re-
dress. The Topel rule severely undercuts the interests of the plaintiff
137. Id. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed. Id. at 682, 431 N.E.2d at 293-94,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33.
138. Id. at 684-85, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (affirming the result reached
by the lower courts).
139. If the court had not applied such a difficult standard, the plaintiff might have won.
As Judge Fuchsberg noted in dissent, the plaintiff raised a classic prima facie case. The
plaintiff's expert testimony revealed that the defendant's treatment deviated from acceptable
medical practice, and caused the patient to die. Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part).
140. See 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 763, 780-89 (1982) (arguing that Topel's rationale of
discouraging psychiatric malpractice suits is unneccessary in light of legislative measures al-
ready in place which serve the same litigation-deterrent function).
141. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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in precisely the case where full judicial examination of the claim
would seem imperative.
C. Unconventional Therapies and the Respectable Minority
Rule142
1. The Respectable Minority Rule: .Underlying Theory
The "respectable minority" rule is a reflection of the courts' rec-
ognition that more than one school of thought may exist within a
given discipline.1 4 Due to the distinctly different nature or scope of
their techniques, the practitioners of different schools of thought
may adhere to contrasting standards of conduct. 1  Where this situ-
ation exists, it is possible that (1) no single school is necessarily best;
and (2) the standard of conduct that applies to one school may not
apply to the other. 14 Medical malpractice law has taken these two
possibilities into account by developing the doctrine that a doctor is
to be judged by the school he professes to follow.' 46
To qualify as a school which courts will recognize, the method
or approach should fall roughly within the definition articulated by
Dean Prosser.147 It must be "a recognized school with definite prin-
ciples, and be the line of thought of at least a respectable minority of
the profession."' 148
2. How the Respectable Minority Rule Applies to Physician
Malpractice
The respectable minority rule provides that the mere use of a
minority approach in treating a patient is not an automatic breach
142. The case law uses the term "respectable" minority interchangeably with "respected"
minority. Both refer to the credibility of a given minority of practitioners who support the
challenged treatment, not to the size of the minority.
143. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 39, § 32, at 187.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Id. Support for this doctrine has a long history. For an early medical malpractice
case in which a court applied the doctrine, see Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116
(1893).
147. Dean Prosser's discussion of the "school" doctrine refers primarily to medical mal-
practice case law. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 39, § 32, at 187. That body of law
includes cases that deal with a full range of medical specialities, including psychiatry. See,
eg., Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Nonmedical techniques of psycho-
therapy are, by analogy, subject to the same principles as are psychiatry and other medical
specialities. Eg., People ex rel. Wellington v. Wellington, 34 Il. App. 3d 515, 340 N.E.2d 31
(1975) (definition of "school" applies to these nonmedical branches of psychiatry just as it
applies to psychiatry itself).
148. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 39, § 32, at 187.
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of the required standard of care.14 9 A physician will avoid liability
for malpractice where his method of treatment is supported by a
respectable minority of physicians. 150 The respectable minority ap-
proach does not suggest, however, that a physician can practice
medical treatments on an independent basis. Liability attaches
when his treatment does not conform to the set standards of the
minority school. 5
3. Application of the Respectable Minority Rule to Schools of
Psychotherapy
The application of the respectable minority rule to psychothera-
peutic malpractice is appropriate given the plethora of distinct ther-
apeutic practices within the mental health field.'52 Each "school"
has its own method, emphasis, and goals. 5 3 Courts ha, e not been
consistent in applying the respectable minority rule to "schools" of
psychotherapy, 154 but where they have applied the rule, the result
has benefited the practitioner of an unconventional therapy.
Minority psychotherapeutic techniques such as the "open door"
approach155 have been especially frequent subjects of litigation. In
Johnson v. United States,'56 the widow of a psychiatric patient chal-
lenged the permissibility of the "open door" policy and balancing
test 157 that the hospital's doctors and psychiatrist had used.1 58 The
149. See, e.g., Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Ariz. 1967) (holding that
prolotherapy, as used by a respectable minority of physicians, was not an inappropriate
method of treatment for the plaintiff's whiplash injuries).
150. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), aff'd, 554 S.W.2d 160
(Tex. 1977); see also Hubbard v. Calvin, 83 Cal. App. 3d 529, 532-33, 147 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907
(1978) (jury instruction characterizing physician's use of minority approach as inculpatory
was reversible error); Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr.
903 (1968) (use of one of several alternative modes of treatment which is accepted by the
profession held to be an exercise of proper care).
151. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 39, § 32, at 187.
152. See, e.g., Lesse, Caveat Emptor?-The Cornucopia of Current Psychotherapies, 36
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 329 (1979).
153. See N. FINKEL, supra note 1, at 62-70 (identifying twenty-two "individual" psycho-
therapies and six "group" therapies).
154. See supra note 101.
155. Advocates of the "open door" policy argue that psychiatric patients need not be
isolated from normal human activities until every possible danger has passed. A traditional
"confinement" approach, they argue, is faulty for two reasons. First, constant supervision
and restriction often promote the very disorders which they are intended to control. Second,
confinement results in prolonged incarceration for many patients who might otherwise be-
come useful members of society. See Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283, 1293
(M.D. Fla. 1976).
156. 409 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
157. Psychiatrists who practice an "open door" method must balance the therapeutic
benefits of release against the possibility of self-inflicted harm or violence to others. If, in the
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patient had committed suicide after having been treated and re-
leased from hospital confinement.159 Noting that other jurisdictions
had recognized the validity of this technique, the court held that the
defendant's "open door" policy was a permissible method of psychi-
atric treatment under applicable state law. 160 Liability would not
arise, said the court, "merely because a psychiatrist favors a newer
[therapeutic] approach over an older one." '161
4. Determining a Respectable Minority
The determination of whether practitioners of a "school of
thought" constitute a respectable minority will often decide the per-
missibility of their therapies. It is clear that psychoanalysis, client-
centered therapy, and other traditional forms of psychotherapy fit
within the definition of a "school." '62 Newer methods such as Ge-
stalt therapy, 6 ' rational-emotive therapy,'"' and transactional anal-
psychiatrist's professional judgment, such benefits outweight the possibility of violence, then
release is acceptable. Id. at 1294. Mere error of professional judgment does not always rise
to the level of negligence. Courts must look to state law to determine whether such error is
actionable. See id. at 1294 & n.18.
158. Id. at 1293-95.
159. Id. at 1290-92.
160. Id. at 1293.
161. Id.; see also Landau v. Werner, 105 SOL. J. 257, 23 THE TIMES (London), Nov. 23,
1961, at 5, col. 1 (psychiatrist held liable for grave deterioration in condition of patient with
whom he had maintained a social relationship under the guise of "therapy"). The justice in
Landau admonished courts to be cautious about finding a physician negligent merely because
his treatment was unsuccessful or contrary to what a large majority of medical opinion would
have recommended.
162. See 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 15, at 9. Both psychoanalysis and client-centered ther-
apy have distinguished and relatively long histories. Freud developed and elaborated the first
psychoanalytic method during the early years of this century. See generally S. FREUD, THE
INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (J. Strachey trans. 1965); S. FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON SEX-
UALITY (1905). Psychoanalysis investigates mental processes by means of free association,
dream interpretation, and transference. N. FINKEL, supra note 1, at 62; see infra notes 184-
87 and accompanying text (transference phenomenon).
Carl Rogers developed client-centered therapy in the early 1940's as an alternative to
Freudian psychotherapy. As its name indicates, client-centered therapy emphasizes the cen-
tral importance of the patient's self-actualization. As Rogers noted: "[T]he probability of
therapeutic movement in a particular case depends primarily not upon the counselor's per-
sonality, nor upon his techniques, nor even upon his attitudes, but upon the way all these are
experienced by the client in the relationship." C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 65
(1951). This form of therapy is premised on the belief that a patient's inherent potential for
growth will be released in a relationship where the therapist offers unconditional, nonjudg-
mental understanding and promotes free expression of feelings. See CURRENT PSYCHO-
THERAPIES 119 (R. Corsini ed. 1973).
163. According to Gestalt therapy, disturbed behavior is the manifestation of a painful
polarization between two elements in a psychological process. The traditional treatment at-
tempts to integrate the discordant elements through active participation by the therapist and
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ysis 165 also are arguably within the definition. 166 The courts have
been more hesitant, however, to classify techniques such as sexual
intimacy167 or rage-reduction 168 as "schools" of practice.
A court should consider several factors in determining whether
a respectable minority supports a given therapy. These factors
might include 1) the existence of a professional association which
follows the method; 2) the existence of articulated standards of
practice; and 3) the existence of ethical guidelines. 169 These criteria
represent an attempt at providing some indicia of whether the
"school" designation should attach to the therapeutic technique in
question.
5. Example: Should Physical Intimacy Be Accorded the Status of
a "School of Thought"?
Physical intimacy between the psychotherapist and the patient
can arise in two ways. First, the therapist might suggest that he and
the patient engage in such conduct as a therapeutic measure. 170
Second, the nature of the psychotherapeutic relationship itself can
engender feelings of physical closeness which may lead to intimate
an emphasis on immediate behavior and feelings. See N. FINKEL, supra note 1, at 65; CUR-
RENT PSYCHOTHERAPIES, supra note 162, at 251.
164. Rational-emotive therapy, which began in the 1950's, is based on the theory that
irrational thinking causes emotional disturbances and that the patient can control or elimi-
nate these disturbances through rational thinking. See N. FINKEL, supra note I, at 65-66.
165. Transactional analysis examines the ego structure of the patient (Le., child, adult,
and parent components) and then assesses single transactions in terms of this structure, with
the result that the patient gains a level of awareness which enables him to make new decisions
about his future behavior. See N. FINKEL, supra note 1, at 66; CURRENT PSYCHOTHERA-
PiEs, supra note 162, at 353.
166. See 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 15, at 9. These methods are not as well established as
are psychoanalysis and client-centered therapy. Each has a sizeable following, however, and
is generally recognized in the literature as a school of thought. See, e.g., N. FINKEL, supra
note 1, at 49-73.
167. See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Civ. Ct. 1975), affid
on appeal, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1976); see infra notes 170-90 and
accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Abraham v. Zaslow, a 1972 unreported California case cited in 3 D. Ho-
GAN, THE REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 36 (1979). In Zaslow, the defendant-psy-
chotherapist was held liable for use of an experimental "rage-reduction" therapy which
resulted in physical and mental injuries to the patient. "The purpose of the therapy was to
break down the patient's resistance through extensive use of tactile stimulation while the
patient was immobilized." Id. This procedure would then allow repressed anger to escape.
Id. But see, e.g., Hammer v. Rosen, 7 A.D.2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959) (psychiatrist
held not liable for practice of "rage reduction" techniques).
169. See 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 15, at 9.
170. Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Civ. Ct. 1975), afid on appeal,
85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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bodily contact between patient and therapist. There is a special
quality of intimacy and intensity that defines the psychotherapeutic
relationship.1 71 A patient generally has frequent personal contact
with the therapist and may even regard him as a friend.1 72 The
process often creates powerful feelings which the patient may attach
or "transfer" to the therapist.1 73 In this "transference" phenome-
non, the patient imputes to the therapist the role of an oppressive
parent or other figure 74 and learns, through seeing himself interact
with the therapist, to work through his problems.
1 75
While sexual contact is not uncommon in psychotherapy,
176
there are few therapists who openly advocate engaging in sex with
patients as a form of therapy. 17 7 By indulging in the romantic as-
pect of the transference phenomenon, the therapist may prevent the
patient from actually working through his psychological
problems.' 78 Arguably, such conduct constitutes malpractice.
The codes of both the American Psychiatric Association and the
American Psychological Association state that it is unethical for
therapists to engage in intimate physical contact.' 79 Yet it is plausi-
171. Marmor, The Seductive Psychotherapist, PSYCHIATRY DIGEST, Oct. 1970, at 10-11.
172. Comment, supra note 4, at 130.
173. T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, supra note 74, at 119.
174. Id. The transference feelings may represent either realistic assessments of or delu-
sional perceptions about the object of the transference. Id.
175. Taub, supra note 3, at 101.
176. A 1973 study found that 5-7.2% of a random sample of psychiatrists had had sexual
intercourse with their patients. The survey also showed that another 5-13% had engaged in
sexual contact short of intercourse. Kardener, Fuller & Mensh, A Survey of Physicians'Atti-
tudes and Practices Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Contact with Patients, 130 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 1077, 1079-80 (1973). A similar study conducted four years later revealed that
6.1% of licensed psychologists had had sexual intercourse with patients. Holroyd & Brod-
sky, Psychologists' Attitudes and Practices Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Contact with Pa-
tients, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 843 (1977).
177. Marmor, supra note 171, at 11-14.
178. Taub, supra note 3, at 101; see also T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, supra note 87, at
119 (arguing that patient may refuse to accept treatment on basis of transference of feelings).
179. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association stated that such conduct was unethi-
cal. See The Principles of Medical Ethics, With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychia-
try, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1061 (1973). The American Psychological Association
followed suit in 1979:
Psychologists are continually cognizant of their own needs and of their inherently
powerful position vis-a-vis clients, in order to avoid exploiting their trust and depen-
dency. Psychologists make every effort to avoid dual relationships with clients
and/or relationships which might impair their professional judgment or increase
the risk of client exploitation. Examples of such dual relationships include treating
employees, supervisees, close friends or relatives. Sexual intimacies with clients are
unethical.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS,
PRINCIPLE 6A: WELFARE OF THE CONSUMER (rev. 1979).
19841
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ble that such a practice may constitute a "school." Those therapists
who do advocate sexual activity as a mode of treatment have in fact
formed a professional group known as the American Association of
Sex Educators, Counselors and Therapists.18 0 This association has
developed its own code of ethics' and has articulated certain stan-
dards of conduct.1 1 2 At least superficially, then, this group would
appear to have all the benchmarks necessary to qualify as a school
of psychotherapy. 1 8
3
The courts have not recognized such conduct as a legitimate
form of therapy; rather, they have consistently treated it as mal-
practice. In Zipkin v. Freeman, s4 for example, the psychiatrist was
held liable for "mishandling" the transference phenomenon when
he induced the patient to become his mistress, took her to functions
outside the consultation room (such as a nude swimming party),
and suggested that she obtain a divorce and move in with him. 8 5
In another case, Roy v. Hartogs, 186 the plaintiff consulted the de-
fendant-psychiatrist specifically for treatment of her sexual
problems. At the suggestion of the psychiatrist, they had sexual
relations over a period of thirteen months as part of her treatment
program."8 7 The plaintiff's mental illness worsened, allegedly as a
result of the defendant's actions, to the extent that she twice had to
be confined to a mental hospital.' The trial court held the psychi-
atrist liable for malpractice, citing the existence of a public policy to
"protect the patient from a deliberate and malicious abuse of power
and breach of trust by a psychiatrist when the patient entrusts to
him her body and mind in the hope that he will use his best efforts
to find a cure."' 89
In the event that attitudes toward sex therapy become more per-
missive or the understanding of sexual needs changes significantly,
courts perhaps may reexamine the prohibition against sex as a ther-
apeutic technique. Absent such a change in the views of practition-
180. See Hall & Hare-Mustin, Sanctions and the Diversity of Ethical Complaints Against
Psychologists, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 728 (1983).
181. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SEX EDUCATORS, COUNSELORS AND THERAPISTS,
CODE OF ETHICS (1980).
182. Id.; see also Hall & Hare-Mustin, supra note 180, at 728.
183. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
184. 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
185. Id.
186. 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Cir. Ct. 1975), aff'd on appeal, 85 Misc. 2d 891,
381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
187. Id. at 351, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 354, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
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ers and society, however, courts will almost certainly continue to
hold therapists liable for engaging in intimate physical contact with
patients. 190
III. THE NEED TO BALANCE EXPERIMENTATION AGAINST
PATIENTS' RIGHTS IN REACHING AN APPROPRIATE
STANDARD OF CARE
An accepted psychotherapeutic practice will pass through three
stages. First it is experimental, then it is recognized as a "new"
procedure, and finally it becomes commonly accepted. 19' In the ex-
perimental phase, the psychotherapist applies the technique at his
peril. 192 But when a significant number of the profession begins to
use it in ordinary practice, the technique should become a legally
accepted practice. 93 An illustration of such an evolution is elec-
troconvulsive therapy. When introduced in 1938 it was a dramatic
experiment with unknown risks. 194 It has now become a conven-
tional, though still controversial, procedure. 195 If courts were to
reject this accepted form of therapy, they "would be penalizing in-
190. Sex therapy has been the subject of increasing criticism by those who question its
efficacy. See, eg., Sobel, Sex Therapy: As Popularity Grows, Critics Question Whether it
Works, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1980, at Cl, col. 5, and Nov. 11, 1980, at Cl, col. 1.
191. Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. RPV. 535,
541 (1959); see, eg., Board of Medical Regis. & Exam. v. Kaadt, 225 Ind. 625, 76 N.E.2d 669
(1948). The Kaadt decision states in relevant part:
A physician is not limited to the most generally used of several approved modes of
treatment and the use of another mode known and approved by the profession is
proper, but every new method of treatment should pass through an experimental
stage in its development and a physician is not authorized in trying untested experi-
ments on his patients.
Id. at 634, 76 N.E.2d at 672.
192. Id.
193. Curran, supra note 191, at 541.
194. Although for many years the popular media has questioned the efficacy of elec-
troconvulsive therapy, objective comments from within the profession attest to its clinical
usefulness. It has been argued that the long-term side effects of electroconvulsive therapy are
rare in modem practice, and that often it is "the only treatment that is likely to be effective
(or sufficiently rapidly effective) in certain life-threatening situations." T. BUTHEIL & P. AP-
PELBAUM, supra note 87, at 96. See also Sobel, Electroshock Treatment: Safer and Quicker
Than Drugs?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1979, at A16, col. 3 (discussing the conflicting views of
former mental patients, public interest groups, and psychiatrists regarding use and abuse of
electroconvulsive treatment); Comebackfor Shock Therapy?/Its Unsavory Reputation May Be
Changing, TIME, Nov. 19, 1979, at 76 (electroconvulsive therapy defended as an effective
mode of treatment for some mental illnesses); Impastato, The Story of the First Electroshock
Treatment, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1113, 1113-14 (1960) (describing the original electrocon-
vulsive experiment).
195. Id.
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telligent advances" in psychotherapy.1 96
One commentator has argued that experimentation should be
given greater deference and, accordingly, greater legal protection. 19 7
The rationale in one court decision suggests such deference. In
Saron v. State,' 98 the plaintiff claimed that the psychiatrist's use of
an experimental drug in the treatment of schizophrenia constituted
malpractice.' 99 An expert witness testified, however, that the al-
leged injury could have been caused by factors other than the
drug."° The testimony as to the then-known consequences of the
drug was equivocal, and the court held for the defendant. 20' The
court thus indicated that, even when there are conflicting opinions
about the efficacy of an experimental therapy, the use of such a ther-
apy should not, as a matter of course, be categorized as malpractice.
Taking deference to experimental techniques one step further, it
has been argued that ethical principles should be established
through experimentation.2 °2 Rules of conduct governing any pro-
fessional activity must, according to this theory, be based upon
knowledge of that activity's potential effects.20 3 If, to the contrary,
policy precedes research, then it inhibits discovery of facts and rele-
vant comparisons that are essential for a full scientific evaluation of
issues in psychotherapy. 2' In the context of principles governing
psychotherapeutic research, this necessary factual basis would arise
from experimentation itself.205
This proposition has touched off a vociferous debate, and has
196. Curran, supra note 191, at 541 (discussing the need for law to respect the mecha-
nisms of advancement in all professions generally).
197. See Gergen, The Codification of Research Ethics: View of a Doubting Thomas, 28
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 907 (1973); cf R. COHEN, MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 73 (1979).
198. 24 A.D.2d 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1965) (mem.).
199. Id. at 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Gergen, supra note 197, at 907-08.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 908.
205. See id. at 907-08. Gergen supports his thesis that researchers should be given more
latitude in experimentation by arguing that strict rules are simply unwarranted. For several
reasons, says Gergen, concern for the personal rights of individuals who are the subjects of
research is misplaced:
If subjects are generally unconcerned about what is to happen to them, if they find
experimental deceptions rather intriguing, if they do not care about the rationale of
the research, and if their attitudes about life and themselves remain untouched re-
gardless of whether the ethical principles [such as obtaining informed consent,
avoiding deception, or allowing the patient freedom to withdraw] are experimen-
tally realized, then establishing and reinforcing the principles simply pose unneces-
sary hardships for the scientist. The life of the research psychologist is difficult
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come under attack as a "contravention of human rights and dig-
nity."2 "6 Anu opponent argues that while such an experimentation
policy would expand understanding and knowledge of the psycho-
therapeutic process," it would also violate the personal rights of
individual research participants.2 "8 For this reason, he says, the
policy is inadequate and is an improper reflection of the profession's
equal concern for both the advancement of psychological science
and protection of the patient's welfare.20 9
In order to balance the need for experimentation against pa-
tients' rights, psychotherapists who use unconventional techniques
must attempt to authenticate those methods which work and those
which do not.210 Unless they do so, it is possible that the mental
health profession might be viewed as a specialty concerned solely
with "radical experimentation." 21' For its part, the law must recog-
nize that there is a place for innovation, and if psychotherapy is to
evolve, courts must be wary of hindering necessary experimen-
tation.
IV. ELEMENTS OF A RELEVANT STANDARD OF CARE
A. Interests Involved
The creation of an appropriate legal standard against which to
measure psychotherapists' conduct must begin with an assessment
of competing interests. Persons who sustain injuries flowing from
the conduct of psychotherapists have an interest in obtaining some
form of compensation for their suffering. The practitioner has an
interest in his freedom to develop new methods of treatment to the
fullest extent that his experience and ability permit. And society,
by virtue of its role in providing for the health and welfare of its
enough without harnessing him with research restrictions that have few real-world
consequences.
Id. at 907.
206. Johnson, Comment on Gergen, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 470 (1974).
207. Gergen, supra note 197, at 911-12. The "accumulation of knowledge" is, for
Gergen, an essential component in the continued efficacy of psychotherapy. See id.
208. Waterman, The Civil Liberties of the Participants in Psychological Research, 29 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 470, 470-71 (1974). For example, it might compromise the doctrine of in-
formed consent to therapy. See generally N. HERSHEY & R. MILLER, HUMAN EXPERIMEN-
TATION AND THE LAW (1976).
209. Id.
210. See 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 15, at 9; Stone, The Quest of the Counterculture, 9
INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 219, 225 (1970). For a detailed analysis of the use of drug treatment in
psychotherapy, see D. KLEIN, R. GITTELMAN, E. QUrTKEN, & A. RIFKIN, DIAGNOSIS AND
DRUG TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: ADULTS AND CHILDREN (2d ed. 1980).
211. Stone, supra note 210, at 225.
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individual members, has a concomitant interest in fostering ad-
vancement within the field of psychotherapy.212
The purpose of a standard embodying these goals is twofold. As
a practical matter, the legal standard must provide guidance to
mental health professionals; as a policy matter, it must be flexible
enough to ensure a fair disposition of the interests that are at stake.
B. Assumptions
1. The Nature of the Psychotherapeutic Process
The relationship between the therapist and patient is inherently
susceptible to abuse.213 The patient suffers from a weakened ego or
mental state and typically will seek a dependency relationship.214
Through "transference" and similar phenomena, the psychothera-
peutic process offers an environment in which dependency can
thrive.2"5 If the patient is injured and chooses to sue his psychia-
trist, there are certain consequences that must be viewed in light of
these conditions.
2. Consequences
a. Informed Consent. Given the nature of the psychotherapeu-
tic process, the patient may be unable to give an "informed" con-
sent.216 Even if he is able to do so, he is probably unable to render a
completely objective consent.21 7 It would seem appropriate, then,
for the courts to view a defense based on informed consent more
critically in psychotherapeutic malpractice cases than they would in
nonpsychotherapeutic circumstances.
b. Establishing the Validity or Invalidity of the Therapy. A
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that a given therapy is
unreasonable.218 The enormous diversity of psychotherapeutic
techniques adds to this burden.219 Moreover, at least one jurisdic-
tion has adopted a rule that increases this burden by requiring the
212. Cf supra note 207 and accompanying text (explaining that the ability of psychother-
apy to advance and thereby become more effective is largely a function of rules that are
promulgated by forces such as professional associations, which are not overly restrictive or
detrimental).
213. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
217. See R. COHEN, supra note 197, at 65-69.
218. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff to negate the factors upon which the defendant-psychiatrist
has based his judgment.22
Given the dependency and potential for manipulation that
emerge from the therapist-patient relationship, the plaintiff's burden
should be lessened.22' One possibility is that the law might require
the defendant-psychotherapist to prove that his conduct did not
cause the injury.
One commentator has even suggested an absolute liability stan-
dard for psychotherapeutic malpractice.222 Such an extreme view
would dispense with the notion of a standard of care as too inconve-
nient for the judicial system to administer. It does, however, focus
needed attention on the desirability of a more uniform standard of
care. But the uniformity that such an approach envisions is proba-
bly unrealistic given the evolutionary nature of and diversity inher-
ent in mental health care.
C. Dynamic Model
In formulating a standard of care to which the practitioner of a
newer therapy should be held, a court should bear in mind the mo-
tives upon which a psychotherapist might base his conduct. Ideally,
he would be motivated by a desire to render effective treatment-
not by fear of a malpractice suit.223 A court must also recognize the
dynamic relationship that exists between accepted current practice
and advancement in the discipline. Where innovation and patients'
rights clash, a court must be prepared to weigh all the interests
against one another. Even the most legitimate claim must not ob-
scure the importance of engaging in an objective evaluation of both
the present risk and the future potential of an unconventional
therapy.
Though courts should always make a careful inquiry, the legal
standard need not keep pace with each and every innovation. Ex-
perimentation carries with it certain risks for which practitioners
should remain liable, and an individual's conduct must fall within
certain professionally-prescribed ethical limits. As a point of depar-
220. See supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
221. This is especially true when verbal therapy is at issue. See supra note 77.
222. Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment" A Proposal for the Application of Strict Liabil-
ity to Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U.L. REv. 391, 409-31 (1978).
223. This is not to suggest that psychotherapists should not contemplate the possibility of
malpractice when devising and implementing new techniques. Rather, in the absence of
other motivational forces, it might instill an attitude of undue precaution which could deprive
individuals of psychotherapeutic treatment altogether.
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ture, the court should make an effort to determine whether the chal-
lenged technique commands the support of a respectable minority.
Sources to which a court could look in deciding this question might
include standards and ethical guidelines articulated by "respecta-
ble" professional associations or similar authorities for the particu-
lar kind of conduct involved in the claim.22 4
The specific rule of law governing the standard of care in a given
case should be a reflection of the tensions that exist between current
psychotherapeutic practice and the current state of innovation. The
standard also should be an intelligent reflection of this balance, rec-
ognizing that the law plays a significant role in creating or stifling
an environment where psychotherapy might fully realize its poten-
tial. The evolution of psychotherapeutic practice over time-as in
the emergence of a given therapy from the realm of the experimen-
tal to that of the commonplace-attests to the profession's dynamic
characteristic.
In short, a dynamic model for standard of care requires the
court in a psychotherapeutic malpractice case to make the following
inquiry:
1) Whether the therapy is conventional or unconventional. If it
is conventional, the parties must present expert testimony to estab-
lish the appropriate standard of care. To prevail, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's conduct deviated from that standard.
2) If the therapy is unconventional, it must be advocated by a
respectable minority of practitioners from which a representative
may testify as to what is the appropriate standard and whether the
defendant breached that standard.
3) If the therapy is both unconventional and experimental so as
to fall outside of a respectable minority following, two matters must
be resolved. First, it must be determined whether the therapy is
ethical. There must also be experts available to testify as to whether
the therapy is reasonable.
To insure a balance between the plaintiff's opportunity to find
suitable experts and the therapist's opportunity to explain the bene-
fits of innovative treatment, the burden of proof shifts under the
dynamic model. If the therapy is conventional, the burden of proof
should lie with the plaintiff. For an unconventional therapy fol-
lowed by a respectable minority of practitioners and involving a
tangible technique such as the administration of drugs, the plaintiff
should have the burden. If the unconventional therapy involves an
224. Cf 3 D. HOGAN, supra note 15, at 9.
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intangible technique such as verbal therapy, the burden of proof
should be placed upon the defendant. Likewise, if an unconven-
tional therapy has no respectable minority following, the burden
should rest with the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
The level of care required of psychotherapists varies according
to whether a particular jurisdiction follows local, national, or spe-
cialist standards of conduct. It also may depend on the burden of
proof that a court allocates to the parties and on the weight that it
assigns to respectable minorities. These factors are especially criti-
cal in assessing whether an unconventional therapy falls within the
limits of acceptable practice. When viewed in its entirety, this juris-
dictional variation reveals an underlying chaos in the law governing
the conduct of psychotherapists. Moreover, the standard of care as
it is currently applied is not a reliable guardian of all interests. It
should provide therapists with clearer guidelines for patient care. It
should also offer assurance to practitioners of new or unconven-
tional therapies that the law will not reject their methods outright.
Finally, it should be cognizant of not only patients' rights but also
the crucial interplay between innovation and potentially more effec-
tive mental health care.
The unified framework embodied in the dynamic model at-
tempts to build into its structure a proper respect for the dynamic
characteristic of psychotherapy. Such an analysis is the most rea-
sonable way of reaching a result that is at once intellectually defen-
sible and individually tailored so as to achieve a rational disposition
of competing interests.
LAWRENCE P. HAMPTON
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